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PROTECTING SACRED GROUND:
THE SAN MANUEL RULING AND IMPLICATIONS

FOR INDIAN CULTURAL RESOURCE
PRESERVATION
Gray O'Dwyer*
INTRODUCTION

Six hundred years ago, all land in America was Indian land.1 Then,
"[Europe] conducted some of her adventurous sons into this western
world.., and discovery gave title... [which] could be consummated
by possession."2 This "doctrine of discovery," agreed upon between
colonial powers, essentially granted title to anyone who could occupy
American soil. Europeans quickly scrambled to negotiate peace
treaties with native tribes so that they could install settlers and thereby
claim territory. The inherent problems with these treaties were
numerous; beyond conflicting interests, 3 outright fraud,4 and language
*
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I For clarity, this Note follows the current federal government practice of
referring to native inhabitants of North America as "Indian" or "American Indian,"
and describing federally-recognized groups as "tribes" or "nations." Individual tribes
are generally recognized by name or location signifier (i.e. Oneida Nation of New
York).
2 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 543 (1832).
3 The Treaty of Easton recognized Indian rights to rich hunting lands in Ohio
in exchange for neutrality during the Seven Years' War. However, the treaty
language included all Indians, not just those represented at the treaty council and also
referred to land not necessarily controlled by those present. When dissatisfied
Shawnee allied with the French, the Iroquois (with support of the British) used the
breach as pretext for securing rights to traditional Shawnee homelands in the Ohio

barriers, the terms of transfer were inherently invalid because the
government that was taking possession of the land already had
absolute title to it.

The doctrine of discovery gave rise to the concept of federal duty.
Over the past two hundred years, the courts have recognized that tribes
are sovereign nations with the power to sign treaties but are
subservient to the United States. 5 Indian land is either in fact occupied
by the United States or held in trust until such time as the government
chooses to exercise its right of possession, regardless of any use or
occupancy privileges conferred by treaty. 6 The United States has a
fiduciary duty to maintain the land in trust and to act in the best

interests of its occupants,7 but in practice this duty is often secondary to
the larger public interest.
In the past, tribes have often brought suit alleging breach of the
government's

fiduciary duty. 8 Many contest that development-

usually resource extraction or public works-on Indian land infringes
on landscapes and sites considered sacred, and by this action, the
government is not acting in the best interests of the tribes. However,
this type of challenge is rarely successful because the burden of proof
required to demonstrate that the government's breach is in conflict
Valley. COLIN G. CALLOWAY, PEN AND INK WITCHCRAFT: TREATIES AND TREATY
MAKING IN AMERICAN INDIAN HISTORY 37-38 (Oxford Univ. Press 2013).
4 The Walking Purchase of 1737 in which the Penns negotiated with the
Delaware for "as much land as a man could walk in a day," beginning at the junction
of the Lehigh and Delaware Rivers. The colony hired the three fastest runners they
could find and ended up claiming 1.2 million acres, far exceeding the Delaware
understanding of the treaty terms. The treaty was contested as recently as 2004. See
Delaware Nation v. Pennsylvania, 446 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 2006).
5 Arising out of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §2, cl. 3
("Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States ...
excluding Indians not taxed."). See also U.S. CONST. art. I, §8 ("Congress shall have
the power to regulate Commerce with foreign nations and among the several states,
and with the Indian tribes.").
6 See generally United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). See also 25
U.S.C. §§ 196, 406-407 (1976); 25 C.F.R. §§ 141-142 (1978).
7 25 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) ("The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under the
direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and agreeably to such regulations as the
President may prescribe, have the management of all Indian affairs and of all matters
arising out of Indian relations."). See also 43 C.F.R. §§ 1000-9999 (2004).
8 See, e.g., Cobell v. Norton, 226 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2002), vacated,
334 F.3d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Cobell 226 F. Supp. at 125 ("The Department of
Interior is truly an embarrassment to the federal government in general and the
executive branch in particular."). See also United States v. White Mountain Apache
Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 474-75 (2003).

with its possessory right-and by extension its duty to the citizens of
the United States-is extremely high, despite the moral
implications of
9
destroying sites integral to Indian cultural heritage.
This Note argues that, under the recent San Manuel decision,
Indian tribes have been described as acting similarly to closely held
corporations, which significantly modifies traditional interpretations of
the rights of tribes as sovereign nations. 10 If a tribe can be described as
similar to a closely held corporation, the relationship between the
government and tribes most properly resembles that between the
government and its citizens, with all accompanying rights and
freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. 11 Part I discusses the
formation of the sovereign nation status of American Indian tribes and
development of the theory of federal trust. Part II demonstrates how
the federal trust relationship has historically been used to justify
adverse uses of Indian sacred sites and laws that affect its
interpretation. Part III argues that courts should amend the existing
concept of tribes as sovereign nations when reviewing tribal
challenges to development, and interpret the protection of sacred lands
as a matter of individual religious freedom protected by the United
States Constitution. 12 Part IV explains why this approach is more
equitable and consistent with existing standards for cultural resource
preservation, and is not in conflict with existing definitions of Indian
tribes under 25 U.S.C. § 2703(5).
I.

THE SOVEREIGN NATION STATUS OF INDIAN TRIBES AND THE
FORMATION OF THE FEDERAL TRUST

The basic language of all treaties between Indian tribes and the
United States contains two general principles. Firstly, that the parties
to the treaty are sovereign nations with the freedom and right to
conclude such a treaty. 13 Secondly, that the tribe is surrendering fee
title to the land to the United States, but not use or occupancy until
9 See generally Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S.
439 (1988).
10 San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306 (D.C. Cir.
2007).
11 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
12 U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 1.
13 See U.S. CONST. art. I, §2, cl. 3 ("Representatives and direct Taxes shall be
apportioned among the several States . . . excluding Indians not taxed."). See also
U.S. CONST. art I, §8 ("Congress shall have the power to regulate Commerce with
foreign nations and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.").

such time as the United States chooses to extinguish that right. 14 The
negotiation of treaties established the concept of the "federal trust,"
which is essentially the legal duty of the government to protect agreed
upon Indian treaty rights of use or occupancy on Indian land while
reserving the right to vacate them. Essentially, the United States
government maintains an overarching duty to act in the interest of its
own citizens while sovereign, Indian powers of self-government exist
at the sufferance of the supreme law of the land.
This tradition of "trust" in actual practice contributed to a
significant lack of trust between Indian tribes and the federal
government, because in many instances the government's role was
interpreted by Indians as adversely paternalistic.15
A. The Marshall Cases, 1823-1832
The Marshall Cases were named for Chief Justice John Marshall,
who wrote the majority opinion in three signature Indian law
decisions. The three cases collectively defined the legal status of
Indian tribes, creating a unique political limbo in which tribes within
the borders of the United States were both subservient to and
dependent on the United States government while maintaining an
independent sovereign status.
The first case was Johnson v. M'Intosh, decided in 1821, which
concerned the ownership of land transferred by treaty from the
Piankeshaw Nation of Illinois to agents of the British government prior
to the American Revolution. 16 Similar to the Virginia case Hite v.
Fairfax,17 there were two conflicting grants on the same land. The
See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
16 Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
17 Hite v. Fairfax, 8 Va. 42 (1786). The decision concerned the vast land area
known as the Northern Neck Proprietary, which stemmed from a 1669 land grant by
Charles II of England to Thomas, Lord Culpeper. The original language granted
Culpeper all the land between the Rappahannock and Potomac Rivers terminating at
the Chesapeake Bay, but failed to clarify the western boundary. The Northern Neck
became essentially an independent fiefdom within Virginia under Culpeper's heir
Thomas, Lord Fairfax in the early eighteenth century. Fairfax administered his own
land grants within the Proprietary and collected his own taxes. A dispute arose
beginning in the 1740s over lands along the Shenandoah River (a tributary of the
Potomac), which were claimed by both the colony of Virginia and Fairfax. Joist Hite
was an agent who was granted large parcels of land by the colony on which to settle
new colonists, but found to his dismay that Fairfax had already granted much of the
same land to his own settlement agent, James Patton. The court was initially called
14
15

plaintiff's claim stemmed from the 1773 treaty between the British and
the Illinois, and the defendant's claim from a grant given after the
Revolution by the United States government. The Johnson opinion
made two significant points in ruling for the defendant: (1) that under
the Treaty of Paris, "the powers of government, and the right to soil,
which had previously been in Great Britain, passed definitively to
these States," 18 and (2) "[Indian] rights to complete sovereignty, as
independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to
dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was
denied." 19
The effect of the Johnson ruling was to preclude any future treaties
between Indian tribes and any party not vested with the authority of
the United States, and to simultaneously invalidate all past treaties on
land within the United States. z° It also clearly defined the status of
Indian tribes as "sovereign" with rights to occupancy and use of
traditional lands, but not ownership of these lands.
The second and third Marshall cases were Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia2 1 and Worcester v. Georgia. Cherokee contested Georgia's
ability to impose or enforce laws 3 on the sovereign Cherokee Nation,
upon to decide the western boundary line of the Northern Neck, but eventually
declared in 1786 that Fairfax's claim was invalid altogether because it was granted
by a British monarch rather than the United States of America. See id.
is Johnson, 21 U.S. at 586.
'9

Id. at 574.

20 The Johnson decision created particular problems for the Virginia Indian

tribes, whose treaties with the British had established reservation lands within the
colony. Only the Mattaponi and Pamunkey (considered one nation between 17811894) retained their reservations until the twentieth century, though they faced
significant challenges in the early nineteenth century. The infamous "Gregory
Petition" of 1843 nearly succeeded in breaking up the reservation, but the Virginia
legislature denied the petition on grounds that the tribe was a defacto family and to
deprive them of their family land would be unjust (and would then make the tribe,
heretofore good taxpayers, a burden on the state). Additional note: the
Pamunkey/Mattaponi established a precedent for taxing Indian personal property,
though not reservation land, until 1917. See HELEN C. ROUNTREE & EDWIN
RANDOLPH TURNER, BEFORE AND AFTER JAMESTOWN (Univ. of Va. Press 2002).
21 Cherokee, 30 U.S. at 1.
22 Worcester, 31 U.S. at 515.
23 The particular law at issue was the Compact of 1802, in which the state of
Georgia paid the United States government $1.2 million in exchange for land in the
Yazoo River drainage area, now the states of Alabama and Mississippi. The land was
(very generally) occupied by the Yazoo Nation, and because of this the Compact
included a proviso that the United States would vacate all pre-existing Indian treaties
and allow Georgia to issue land grants to settlers on former Indian land. The
Cherokee had a longstanding history of treating with both the British and the United

citing the earlier Johnson decision granting sovereign nation status to
tribes. The Court ruled that the United States Constitution, under the
commerce clause, distinctly separated Indian tribes from foreign
nations; therefore, the tribe did not retain the rights, powers, or status
of a foreign nation. 24 The opinion reiterated that Indian tribes had a
right to occupy land "until that right shall be extinguished by a
voluntary cession to our government," 25 but for the first time described
Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations. 2 6 Marshall stated that:
Their relation to the United States resembles that of a
ward to his guardian. They look to our government
for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power;
appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the
president as their great father. They and their country
are considered by foreign nations, as well as by
ourselves, as being so completely under the
sovereignty and dominion of the United States, that
any attempt to acquire their lands, or to form a
political connexion [sic] with them, would be
considered by all as an invasion of our territory, and
an act of hostility. 27
The Supreme Court denied injunctive relief in Cherokee because
the Cherokee Nation was not independent, and therefore could not
properly bring suit against Georgia. The following year, Georgia
authorities arrested a missionary, Samuel Worcester, on the grounds
that his presence within the bounds of Indian land violated Georgia
state law prohibiting non-Indians from being on Indian land without a
license. Worcester contested that he had the permission of the
Cherokee Nation, and therefore was not subject to Georgia law. The
Supreme Court upheld Worcester's case, stating under the
Constitution's commerce clause, the federal government reserved
exclusive right to regulate Indian tribes. Importantly, the decision did
not say that Indian nations were the same as foreign nations, and

States, up to and including a treaty ratified by Congress in 1819, and this was the
basis for their 1831 claim for injunctive relief against the state.
24 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 8.
25 Cherokee, 30 U.S. at 17.
26 Id.
27

Id. at 18.

28
therefore
did
not overturn
it only clarified the
29 the Cherokee decision,
question of
jurisdiction.

B. United States v. Kagama (1886)
United States v. Kagama concerned the prosecution of two
Indians for the murder of another Indian within the confines of a
reservation. 30 The primary matter before the Supreme Court was not
the crime itself, but whether the federal court had the appropriate
authority to hear a case between Indians that occurred on Indian land.31
Kagama cited Worcester and ruled that the federal government had
absolute jurisdiction over both reservations and tribe members, further
32
establishing the plenary power of the federal courts in Indian affairs.
The major impact of the Kagama case was contained within the
language of the decision. Though federal jurisdiction over Indian
crimes was an expansion of powers not previously exercised by the
government, it was not a reversal of policy and there existed a legal
precedent based on the earlier Marshall cases.3 3 The decision also
reinforced the very practical power of the federal government to
administer all aspects of Indian life, as it had been doing for some time
through force, confinement, legal obstruction, and management of

28 Tradition holds that Worcester was actually an attempt at reversal because

John Marshall regretted the Cherokee decision. However, Worcester actually created
legal grounds for President Martin Van Buren to enforce the Indian Removal Act
passed by Congress in 1830. The Act made Indian treaty land available to white
settlers, justifying the taking as an exchange for lands in the Indian Territory of
Oklahoma. Ironically, the Oklahoma lands had been seized for that purpose from
other Indian tribes under treaty. The "removal" of the Cherokee from Georgia to
reservations in Oklahoma caused thousands of deaths, and is known generally as the
Trail of Tears.
29 See also Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982) (ruling that
the tribe maintained the ability to self-govern and the right to impose a tax approved
by the Department of the Interior on resources extracted from reservation land in
order to fund that government; generally, ultimate authority over tribal government
remained vested in the federal government.); Am. Indian Agric. Credit Consortium,
Inc. v. Fredericks, 551 F. Supp 1020 (1982) (ruling that tribal courts may be
protected from the intrusion of state courts, but in no way preclude federal
jurisdiction where properly invoked (citing Am. Indian Nat'l Bank v. Red Owl, 478
F. Supp. 302, 305 (1979)).
30 Kagama, 118 U.S. at 375.
31 Id. at 376.
32 Id. at 384-385.
33 Id. at 385.

tribes by federal government agents.

Though Indian tribes had

previously maintained at least the pretext of certain rights associated

with the power to make treaties,35 the language in Kagama made 36
it
diminished,
and
"weak
and
subservient,
were
tribes
the
that
clear
37
without the ability to make decisions on their own behalf.

The change in policy regarding interactions with Indian tribes
between the 1820s and the 1880s was closely linked to the success of
American military forces in defeating tribal resistance to occupation.
In 1820, Indian tribes were regarded much as they had been for the
past two centuries of colonization: as a force to be feared and reckoned
with. Treaties were necessary tools to prevent bloodshed, and also to
prevent angry tribes from allying with powerful enemies of the young
United States as they had in the Seven Years' War,3 8 the War of 1812,

and the Creek War.39
By the 1880s, the Indian threat had diminished significantly.
Through brutal military action, American forces had systematically
eliminated much of the Indian military strength west of the
Mississippi. 40 The negotiation of treaties was reduced to a formality,

and most tribes were confined to reservations under military guard. 41
In September 1886, the United States concluded its last major Indian

34 See generally 25 U.S.C. §§ 1-17; 25 C.F.R. §§ 1-5 (2004); see also U.S.
CONST. art. I,§ 8,cl. 3 (congressional power to regulate commerce with the Indian
tribes); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (presidential power to make treaties); U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (congressional power to make regulations governing the
territory of the United States). See also Cherokee, 30 U.S. at 17.
35 See Fellows v. Blacksmith, 19 How. 366 (1857). See also Kansas Indians, 72

U.S. 737 (1867); New York Indians, 72 U.S. 761 (1867).
36 Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384.
37 Id. at 385.
38 Also known within North America as the French and Indian War, in which
many Algonkian-speaking nations fought on behalf of the French and the Iroquois
nations fought for the British. Both groups played major roles in the outcome of the
war.
39 During the War of 1812, a Shawnee-led confederation under Tecumseh
fought on behalf of the British. After the British were defeated, Tecumseh's forces
recruited allies in the Southeast, igniting the Creek Wars and the Seminole War.
Spain supported the Indian forces during the Creek and Seminole Wars, hoping to
regain a foothold in North America. Another major concern during the antebellum
period was that the slave population might also revolt in support of the Indians. See
JOHN TEBBEL & KEITH JENNISON, THE AMERICAN INDIAN WARS (Castle 2003), for
more information on the American Indian Wars.
40 BILL YENNE, INDIAN WARS 114 (Westholme Pub. 2008).
41 Id.

war with the capture and surrender of the Apache leader Geronmo.42
Small-scale engagements continued into the twentieth century, but
43
never again presented a major challenge to the modern U.S. military.
The Kagama decision represented an important change, directly
related to the reduced military capacity of the Indian tribes. Confined
to reservations, regularly attacked by American military units on the
slightest pretext, 44 and forced to subsist on government largesse,
Indians in the late nineteenth century no longer had the ability to
defend their political rights. 45 Expanding federal jurisdiction over
Indians, tribes, and reservations marked a shift from a policy of
negotiation to one of patronage.
The Kagama opinion, written by Justice Samuel Freeman Miller,
concluded that the Indians had, up to that moment, maintained "a
semi-independent position when they preserved their tribal relations;
not as States, not as nations, not as possessed of the full attributes of
sovereignty, but as a separate people.., thus far not brought under the
laws of the Union or of the State within whose limits they resided. 46
However, Miller argued that the removal of Indian treaty power in
1871 under the Indian Appropriations Act47 negated the idea of a
"separate people" and that Indians should be subject to all federal laws
as wards of the United States government. Miller further articulated,
for the first time, the concept of the federal trust:
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They
are communities dependent on the United States.
Dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent for
their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the
States, and receive from them no protection. Because
of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where
they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From
42

Id. at 277.

43 See WILLIAM M. OSBORN, WILD FRONTIER: ATROCITIES DURING THE
AMERICAN-INDIAN WAR FROM JAMESTOWN COLONY TO WOUNDED KNEE (2009), for

a detailed historiography of the Indian Wars.
44 As in the famous 1890 Ghost Dance incident at Wounded Knee Creek, in
which the U.S. 7th Cavalry massacred over 200 unarmed Lakota gathered for a
religious ceremony. YENNE, supra note 40, at 292.
45 Indian Appropriations Act of 1871, R.S. § 2079, 25 U.S.C § 71 (1871).
46 Kagama, 118 U.S. at 381-382.
47 Indian Appropriations Act of 1871, R.S. § 2079, 25 U.S.C § 71 (1871) ("the
Indian tribes, ceasing to be treaty-making powers, have become simply the wards of
the nation").

their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due
to the course of dealing of the Federal Government
with them and the treaties in which it has been
promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with
it the power. 48

Miller described the Indians as weak and helpless, and noted that
the duty of the federal government to protect their interests was
"necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among
whom they dwell. 49 Indian tribes no longer occupied unsettled land
beyond the borders of the United States; they lived entirely surrounded
50
by states or territories, and in proximity to thousands of settlers.
Miller concluded, with some justification, that there existed potential
for ongoing conflict and also that there would be continued calls to
eliminate the remaining reservations. 5 1 The federal trust established
that the Indians had a right to the occupancy and use of lands agreed
upon in pre-1871 treaties, but that all administration of those lands
rested firmly within the purview of the federal government.
C. United States v. Nice (1916)

United States v. Nice,52 decided in 1916, raised the question of
Indian citizenship in the courts and contributed to the enactment of the
Indian Citizenship Act of 1924. 53 Originally, under the Constitution,
the formula for determining the number of delegates for each state to
the House of Representatives was based on "the whole number of free
Persons

. .

.

excluding Indians not taxed,"

54

which distinguished

Indians from the general population.
The courts had traditionally interpreted this provision two ways.
Firstly, it was interpreted that Indians who were members of a tribe
and, generally, those who lived on reservations, could not be taxed.
This appeared concurrent with status as sovereign nations, and it was
assumed that tribes would impose internal taxes necessary to maintain
48 Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383-384.
49
50

id.
WILLIAM

AMERICAN-INDIAN

M.

OSBORN,

WILD FRONTIER:

WAR FROM JAMESTOWN COLONY

ATROCITIES

(2009).
51

Id.
United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916).
53 Act of June 2, 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253 (1924).
54 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
52

DURING

TO WOUNDED

KNEE

THE
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self-government. 55 Secondly, because Indians did not count toward
totals calculated to provide fair representation, Indians were not
eligible for such representation. 56 Indians were essentially outside the
system, subject only to the supreme law of the land so conferred by
territorial possessory rights under the doctrine of discovery.
Years of removal policies resulted in many Indians being confined
to limited reservation lands without means of support other than
welfare-type assistance provided by the government. Many Western
tribes, in particular, were unable to practice traditional lifeways
involving hunting over large territories and seasonal relocation. 57 The
federal government actively promoted assimilation for Indians,
described by President Grant in his 1871 State of the Union address:
[At this time] many tribes of Indians have been
induced to settle upon reservations, to cultivate the
soil, to perform productive labor of various kinds, and
to partially accept civilization. They are being cared
for in such a way, it is hoped, as to induce those still
pursuing their old habits of life to embrace the only
opportunity 58
which
is left
them to
avoid
extermination.
Faced with such a choice, becoming part of American society was
literally an issue of survival. Traditional clothing was abandoned,
native languages suppressed, and the influence of tribal governments
waned among the younger generations. Claiming or displaying Indian
heritage was often discouraged if not actually outlawed, 59 and many
55 Questioned in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
56 See U.S. CONST. art. I, §2, cl. 3 ("Representatives and direct Taxes shall be
apportioned among the several States ... excluding Indians not taxed.").
57 See generally ROGER L. NICHOLS, AMERICAN INDIANS IN U.S. HISTORY

(Univ. of Okla. Press 2014).
58 Ulysses S. Grant, President of the United States, Third Annual Message
(Dec. 4, 1871) (transcript available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=
29512).
59 Virginia in particular is known for its 1924 Racial Integrity Act, which
required all Virginians to identify as either "white" or "colored." The "colored"
category covered all non-whites, including blacks, Hispanics, South Asian Indians,
Asians, and American Indians. Any person with "one drop" of non-white heritage
was considered colored. This has proved a persistent challenge for modern Virginia
Indians attempting to trace their heritage and for those tribes seeking federal
recognition because they have no certified Indian ancestors between 1924 and the
RIA's repeal in 1975. An Act To Preserve Racial Integrity, 1924 Va. Acts ch. 371.

Indians saw assimilation as the best possible means of ensuring a
successful future. The 1887 General Allotment Act further advanced
assimilation by offering tribe members on certain reservations the
option of claiming an allotment of land which could thereafter be
treated as de facto private property. All land outside the allotments or
not claimed was to61be considered public land held in trust by the
federal government.
In Nice, the defendant was charged with violation of the 1897
Indian Appropriations Act, which prohibited the sale of alcohol to
Indians. 62 The defense contended that, under section 6 of the General
Allotment Act 63 which declared all Indians who claimed allotments to
be citizens of the United States, selling alcohol to an Indian was no
different than selling it to any other citizen.
The opinion concluded that the district court's failure to prosecute
64
the defendant was in error because Indians were not in fact citizens.
In his opinion, Justice Willis Van Devanter cited Kagama in
determining firstly that Indians were subject to federal law and not the
laws of the states (i.e. regulating the sale and distribution of alcohol)
under the federal commerce clause, and secondly that the language of
the Allotment Act did not indicate that "the national guardianship was
to be presently terminated. 65
However, in direct contrast to all previous judicial or legislative
policy, the opinion also indicated that the federal trust relationship was
not intended to exist in perpetuity. Specifically, "[u]pon examining the
whole act, as must be done, it seems 66certain that the dissolution of the
tribal relation was in contemplation."
D. Native American Church and the FirstAmendment

Later twentieth century cases continued to explore the parameters
of Indian citizenship and the application of federal law. Theoretically,
60 General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended in

scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.).
61 General Allotment Act § 5 ("[held] in trust for the sole use and benefit of the
Indian").
62 Nice, 241 U.S. at 591.
63 General Allotment Act, ch. 119 ("Every individual Indian who receives trust
patents is bestowed with United States citizenship.").
64 Nice, 241 U.S. at 595 (1916). See also Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231
F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956).
65 Id.
66

Id.

at 599.

if Indians were subject to federal law, then they were subject to the
United States Constitution and all its amendments, including the Bill
of Rights. The First Amendment prohibits the federal government
from any action preventing the free exercise of religion; many saw this
as a way to protect Indian cultural heritage because 6traditional
practices were in many cases closely tied to native religions. 7
Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council was unique in
that it pitted the Navajo tribal government against a church claiming to
incorporate pre-assimilation Navajo religion. 6 8 The dispute was over
the use of peyote, which was outlawed under an ordinance passed by
the Navajo Tribal Council. 69 The Native American Church encouraged
peyote use as part of its religious services and filed suit challenging the
council's ability to enforce the ordinance.7 0 The church argued that
federal law protecting the free exercise of religion trumped tribal

authority

71

The Court ruled narrowly that the Constitution did not necessarily
apply to citizens, but rather only to Congress and, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, to the states v2 Under the rule of law established by the
Marshall decisions, Indian tribes were neither states or foreign nations,
and therefore the Constitution did not apply per se. The opinion
claimed that: "[The Constitution] is binding upon Indian nations only
where it expressly binds them, or is made binding by treaty or some
act of Congress. No provision in the Constitution makes the First
Amendment applicable
to Indian nations nor is there any law of
''3
so.
doing
Congress
The effect of the Native American Church decision was to further
clarify that the only relationship between Indian tribes and the federal
government was one of fiduciary duty. The government, as established
by later decisions such as United States v. Mitchell, 74 could be held in
breach of that duty but could not be charged with violating the civil
rights of tribes because they, in effect, had none other than those rights
amend. I.
Native Am. Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (1959).
69 Id. at 132.
70 id.
67 U.S. CONST.
68

71 Id.
72 Id.

at 133.
Id. at 135.
74 The plaintiff, representing the Quinault and Quileute tribes, successfully
claimed that the United States was in breach of its fiduciary duty for mismanagement
of the Quinault Reservation's timber resources. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S.
206 (1983).
71

specifically conferred by treaty or act of Congress. The cases herein
described serve to illustrate four specific issues related to the
formation of the federal trust relationship between Indian tribes and
the United States of America. Firstly, that the tribes are defined as
sovereign nations, distinct and separate from either states or foreign
powers, but subservient to the federal government. Secondly, that
because the Indian tribes are subservient, the federal government is
obligated to act in their interests. Thirdly, that though the federal
government is required to act in the best interests of the tribes and,
under certain acts of Congress Indians are recognized to be citizens of
the United States for specific purposes, they do not enjoy the same
rights as citizens: "An Indian . . . even though a citizen, is still an

Indian, and an Indian ward as well. '75 Finally, that Indians do not have
the same rights as citizens because they are members of sovereign
nations, and therefore neither the Constitution of the United States nor
its amendments apply.
Critics of the federal trust relationship have described it as
paternalistic, perpetuating a nineteenth century vision of tribes as
incapable of self-determination. The actions of the federal government
on behalf of tribes, and importantly, on behalf of the tribal land
granted by treaty and held in trust, are therefore both necessary and
just. The case histories presented here would appear to support that
interpretation because the precedent leaves few opportunities for tribes
to challenge federal administration of tribal resources.
II. ADVERSE USE OF INDIAN LAND AND CULTURAL RESOURCE
LOSSES EMPOWERED BY THE FEDERAL TRUST

Major controversies arose in the twentieth century over the use of
Indian land held in trust. The 1887 General Allotment Act provides for
"the right of Congress to grant right of way through lands granted to
an Indian person or tribe, or condemn such lands to public uses, upon
making just compensation. ,,76 Beginning in the 1920s and 1930s,
former Indian lands were taken in a process functionally similar to
eminent domain and used for public works such as roads, dams, and
reservoirs. The government also realized the value of the natural
resources contained within Indian lands and began issuing permits to
private companies for extraction or use.
75 Kagama, 118 U.S. at 375.
76

General Allotment Act, ch. 119.

The government held that these actions were firstly well within the
rights of the federal government, and secondly that they were in the
best interest of the tribes because the tribes would receive the same
benefit as the public at large. 77 Any losses or damages would be
compensated fairly in accordance with the General Allotment Act. 78
As articulated in Nice and Navajo, the only laws that apply to Indian
tribes are those enacted by Congress and Congress reserved the
authority (conferred under the doctrine of discovery) to abrogate the
terms of any and all treaties should it see fit to do so.
This policy of loosely interpreting the fiduciary duties obligated by
the federal trust led to several major losses for Indian tribes who
sought to protect places and artifacts associated with their cultural
heritage. The government dealt with Indian religious issues in two
distinct phases, each with a corresponding policy. Before the civil
rights era, the government acted aggressively to use Indian lands and
resources in ways calculated to benefit the United States with limited
regard for potential harm. 79 Beginning in the 1960s, legislative reforms
were passed that offered some protections to Indian cultural heritage
and judicial opinions became more willing
to challenge the
so
trust.
federal
the
of
administration
government's
In general, the exercise of many traditional American Indian
religions involves either the performance of religious ceremonies at a
specific site considered sacred to the tribe, or the reverence of such a
place. Though American Indian religions vary greatly between tribes
and are incredibly diverse, most maintain that a connection to ancestral
lands is indivisible from the religion itself.81 Historical sites associated
77 See generally Journeycake v. Cherokee Nation, 28 Ct. Cl. 281 (U.S. 1893).
78 General Allotment Act, ch. 119 (The policy of allotment was formally ended

in 1934 with the Indian Reorganization Act, but the 1934 Act did not refute or
challenge federal uses of land held in trust).
79 General Allotment Act, ch. 119 (In fairness, this type of management was
applied to many federal resources not associated with Indians and had long-lasting
environmental and political consequences prior to reforms in the late twentieth
century).
so See Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912) ("[D]oubtful expressions, instead
of being resolved in favor of the United States, are to be resolved in favor of a weak
and defenseless people, who are wards of the nation, and dependent wholly upon its
protection and good faith." (quoting Kagama, 118 U.S. at 375)); see also Alaska
Pacific Fisheries Co. v. United States, 248 U.S. 78.
81 This is in direct contrast to many Christian traditions common in the United
States that view the church as an extension of its members irrespective of location
"for wherever two or three are gathered in my name, there am I [God] with them."
Matthew 18:20, New Int'l Version.

with Indian dwellings, uses, or remains also have religious importance
and in practice Indian traditional culture and religious expression have
been considered inextricably bound.
In 1944, Congress approved the Pick-Sloan Plan to dam the
Missouri River.82 The project would improve access to water for
thousands of Plains farmers and had important implications for the
future success of the U.S. wheat industry. The plan's scope covered
nine states and proposed to flood approximately 300,000 acres of
Indian reservation lands .83 Within the flood areas were Indian towns,
grazing lands, agricultural land, and numerous sacred sites including
burial grounds.84 The plan proceeded with the full knowledge and
cooperation of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and tribe memberss5
affected by the dams were told to abandon their homes immediately.
Construction began in 1946 in South Dakota and continued apace; if
tribes, including the Yankton Sioux, Standing Rock Sioux, and Three
Affiliated Tribes (Arikara, Hidatsa, and Mandan), contested the plan
based on their treaty rights, Congress passed legislation to vacate the
treaties86

Congress moved in 1958 to condemn the remaining Indian land
that would be flooded by the Oahe Dam, just north of Pierre, South
Dakota.87 The Standing Rock Sioux challenged the matter in court
saying that the federal government had breached its fiduciary duty by
compensating the tribes far less than the land was worth.8s The case,
United States v. 2,005.32 Acres of Land, resulted in a temporary

victory for the Standing Rock Sioux, on the grounds that the United
States was required to demonstrate specific legislative intent, rather

82 Flood Control Act of 1944, ch. 664, Pub. L. No. 78-534, 58 Stat. 887 (1944).
83 See HARRIETT SKYE, MINI NATAKA Pi: THE OAHE DAM AND THE STANDING

ROCK PEOPLE, 1900-1960 (2007), for a complete narrative of the case.
84

Id. at 52.

85

Id. at 53.

86

See Indians, Settlement Contracts, Pub. L. No. 81-870, 64 Stat. 1093 (1950)

("An Act to authorize the negotiation and ratification of separate settlement contracts
with the Sioux Indians of Cheyenne River Reservation in South Dakota and of
Standing Rock Reservation in South Dakota and North Dakota for Indian lands and
rights acquired by the United States for the Oahe Dam and Reservoir, Missouri River
development, and for other related purposes.").
87 United States v. 2,005.32 Acres, 160 F. Supp. 193 (D.S.D. 1958) (citing 33
U.S.C. §§ 591, 2322 as federal authority).
88 Id.

than making such general use of existing statutes. 89 However, the
Court made clear:
The authority of Congress to exercise the right of
eminent domain over Indian tribal lands is not
questioned. We are granting the motion of the Tribe
because of a lack of exercise of this authority. The
matter can be speedily remedied
by bringing it to the
90
Congress.
the
of
attention
In the 1960s, reform movements gained traction and American
Indian tribes found allies among historic preservation and
environmental advocates. In 1966, Congress enacted the National
Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), 91 which provided for the
documentation, stewardship, and preservation of historical and
archaeological resources. In 1969, the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) 92 was passed to afford similar protections to
environmental resources.
The major effect of both acts was to create a review process for all
projects overseen by federal agencies (including actions by private
entities using public funds). Under NHPA, the review process requires
all proposals to conduct detailed assessments of the predicted impact
on known historical and archaeological sites. 93 NEPA contains a
similar provision requiring
assessment of potential impacts on
94
resources.
environmental
The application, however, is somewhat different. The courts have
held repeatedly 95 that mitigation of environmental impacts is a
reasonable and sound approach to allow for the construction of
necessary public works. For obvious reasons, mitigation or exchange
89 Id. See also Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 449 U.S. 953 (1980);
Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977); Menominee Tribe v. United
States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
90 2,005.32 Acres, 160 F. Supp. at 202.
91 National Historic Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-665, 80 Stat. 915 (1966)
(codified as amended at 54 U.S.C. §§ 300101-320301).
92 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat.
852 (codified as amended 42 UI.S.C. §§ 4321-70).
93 National Historic Preservation Act § 106.
94 42 UI.S.C. § 4369a.

95 See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (1972);
Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1972); Robertson v.
Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989). See also Te-Moak Tribe of
Western Shoshone of Nev. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 608 F.3d 592 (2010).

is not often a valid approach to historic preservation. 96 Usually, a
solution is negotiated based on the need for the proposed project, the
potential benefit, the significance of the historical or archaeological
site that is affected, and the extent of the potential impact.
NEPA and associated laws protecting the environment and things
of historical or cultural value 97 proved to be useful tools for tribes
contesting federal uses of Indian land. Not only were the review and
documentation processes helpful in identifying sites, particularly
archaeological sites, the tribes were in many cases supported by
advocacy groups with deep pockets and significant public support.
One such omnibus case was Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Association, 98 which involved not only Indian tribes
affected by proposed road construction and timber harvesting, but also
the Wilderness Society, the Sierra Club, the Audubon Society, and the
Northcoast Environmental Resource Council, among others. 99 The
complaint cited breaches of numerous protective laws, but also alleged
violation of the Indians' First Amendment right to freely express their
religious beliefs. Allegedly, the road and harvesting would prevent
members of the affected tribes from holding religious ceremonies in
areas of the Six Rivers National Forest near Chimney Rock.
Religious practice became an issue in Indian decisions only after
1978, when Congress passed the American Indian Religious Freedom
Act (AIRFA).1"° In the Navajo decision, the court made it clear that
the First Amendment did not apply to Indians or Indian tribes. 10 1
Essentially, the Constitution applied to Congress and the states but not
to Indians because they were sovereign nations. The language in
AIRFA specifically refuted Navajo, saying:
[H]enceforth it shall be the policy of the United States
to protect and preserve for American Indians their
96 See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978);
Vieux Carre v. Brown, 875 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1989); Neighborhood Ass'n of the
Back Bay, Inc. v. Fed. Transit Admin., 463 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2006).
97 Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (1988); see also National
Forest Management Act of 1976, 16
Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C.
98 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 439.
99 Northwest Indian Cemetery
(N.D. Cal. 1983).
100 American Indian Religious

U.S.C. § 1612 (1988); Federal Land Policy and
§§ 1712(f), 1739(e) (1988).
Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586

Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469
(1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996).
101 Navajo, 272 F.2d at 135.

inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and
exercise the traditional religions of the American
Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiians,
including but not limited to access to sites, use and
possession of sacred objects, and the freedom1 2 to
worship through ceremonials and traditional rites. 0
This de facto extension of First Amendment religious freedom
protections to Indian tribes added a new dimension to challenges
against the federal trust relationship. Previously, the federal trust was
predicated on two specific, irrefutable points; firstly, that Indian
sovereign nation status excluded them from the rights of American
citizens, and second, that the federal government was obligated to act
in the best interests of Indian tribes. The burden of proof required to
demonstrate that the federal government was acting in opposition to
the interests of the Indian tribes was enormous. Importantly, applying
the language of the First Amendment under the Sherbert test required
plaintiffs to prove only that: (1) they have a sincere religious belief;
and (2) the government action is a substantial burden on their free
exercise of that religious belief. 103 If these principles are sufficiently
demonstrated, the government must prove for its part that: (1) the
government is acting in furtherance of a compelling interest; and (2) it
has pursued that interest in the least restrictive
or burdensome manner
104
with regards to the stated religious belief.
Unfortunately, post-AIRFA decisions rejected the Sherbert test and
did not limit the federal government's assumed authority in
administering the federal trust. The Lyng court cited concern that "that
recognition of Indian religious rights could paralyze the government's
ability to manage and use large amounts of federal property," ° 5 and
the majority opinion issued by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
effectively stripped AIRFA of any enforcement power.1°6 The opinion

102American Indian Religious Freedom Act § 1.
103

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (refuted by Employment Division

v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (the test was passed into law under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993)).
104 Id.

Lyng, 485 U.S. at 439. Kristen L. Boyles, Saving Sacred Sites: The 1989
Proposed Amendment to the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 76 CORNELL
L. REV. 1117, 1147 (1991).
106 Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
105

referenced
the 1986 decision in Bowen v. Roy 1 0 7 in denying the claim,
stating:
"The Free Exercise Clause affords an individual
protection from certain forms of governmental
compulsion; it does not afford an individual a right to
dictate the conduct of the Government's internal
procedures." The building of a road or the harvesting
of timber on publicly owned land cannot
meaningfully be distinguished from
the use of a
10 8
Roy].
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Social
Justice O'Connor further said, "[N]owhere in [AIRFA] is there so
much as a hint of any intent to create a cause of action or any
judicially enforceable individual rights." 10 9 That statement effectively
reduced AIRFA from law to policy,
diminishing its utility in
110
preventing abuses of the federal trust.
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, there were numerous cases
against federal actions on Indian land that claimed breach of any law
that might be applicable, including NEPA, NHPA, AIRFA, and
AIRFA's descendant laws-the Native American Graves Protection
and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) 111 and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). 112 NHPA and NEPA cases were
generally unsuccessful because the Court liberally permitted the
government to mitigate damages or amend its plans to minimize
potential harms.
AIRFA, as described, had no weight of enforcement, but RFRA
(which reinstated the Sherbert test) proved slightly more useful in that
it specifically applied to "all Federal and State law, and the
107

Id. at 696 (Indian parents claimed that assignment of a Social Security

number to their infant daughter violated the Establishment Clause and interfered with
their religious practice, to wit "[the number would] rob the spirit of [their] daughter
and prevent her from attaining greater spiritual power").
108 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 448-449 (internal citation omitted).
at 455.
For an excellent discussion of AIRFA, its history, and proposed
amendments, see Boyles, supra note 105, at 1147.
III Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, Pub. L. No. 101601, 104 Stat. 3048 (1990) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 3001-13) (generally
providing for the disposal, reburial, possession, or protection of American Indian
remains and associated artifacts).
112 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 103 Pub. L. No. 141, 107 Stat. 1488
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb).
109 Id.

110

implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and
whether adopted before or after the enactment of this Act." 113
Therefore, the RFRA did apply to federal laws regarding use of Indian
land and sidestepped the issue of constitutional applicability described
in Navajo. Also, importantly, RFRA prohibited the government from
burdening the religious expression of any person, not citizen, and
thereby applies even to Indian tribes considered sovereign. 114
The federal trust relationship evolved significantly throughout the
twentieth century, and the courts interpreted it, on a whole,
conservatively. Prior to the civil rights era, federal administration of
Indian land held in trust was aggressive, highly prejudicial toward the
overarching public good, and in many cases the Indian tribes received
limited benefits or compensation. After the 1960s, various laws
intended to protect American cultural and environmental resources had
the effect of bolstering Indian challenges to federal actions and the
courts, though not especially sympathetic, began to recognize the
importance of preserving elements of Indian heritage. AIRFA, passed
in 1978, initially appeared to have a sweeping effect on protection of
Indian cultural and religious rights but was rendered ineffective by the
Supreme Court's ruling in Lyng. 115 However, the passage of RFRA by
Congress offered a potential reinstatement of protections by
specifically prohibiting any state
or federal law from infringing on any
116
person's religious freedoms.
III.

INTERPRETING THE SAN MANUEL DECISION AND POTENTIAL
APPLICATIONS

The preceding history of the federal trust and modern struggles
to interpret it have hinged primarily on recognizing American Indians
as "other": neither citizens nor foreigners, outside the law but subject
to it in certain prescribed ways. There is no agreed-upon framework
for applying Indian law, and it has been largely left to the courts and
the legislature to assume responsibility as circumstances dictate. The
incorporeal nature of the law regarding Indian affairs has already
proved to be detrimental to both the tribes and irreplaceable cultural
resources.

Religious Freedom Restoration Act §6.
Religious Freedom Restoration Act §3.
115 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 442.
116 Religious Freedom Restoration Act §3.
113

114

Nice provided for the eventual dissolution of the federal trust, and
later decisions introduced the necessity of legislation, enacted with
specific intent, to alter any existing relationship between the federal
government and the sovereign Indian nations. It is arguable that the
San Manuel decision and RFRA can together be interpreted to have
the effect of significantly changing the scope of the federal trust to
confer greater protections for the individual cultures of Indian tribes
and their inalienable right to certain autonomies.
San Manuel concerned a labor dispute at an Indian-run casino.117 A
union 1 s filed suit alleging that the tribe had, in the management of its
casino, engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA)."' The casino defended its actions on
the grounds of tribal sovereignty, asserting that the NLRA was
inapplicable because the described practices were actions of the tribal
government within the bounds of a reservation. 120 The court found in
favor of the union and, importantly, determined that a tribal
government engaged
in commerce was acting "like a closely held
121
corporation."
Casinos and gambling on Indian lands became popular sources of
revenue for tribes beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, following the
Court's decision in Bryan v. Itasca County.122 Bryan concerned an
Indian couple living on a Minnesota reservation, who received a state
property tax bill. 123 The Court ruled that, as in Cherokee and
Worcester, state law did not apply to Indians on Indian reservations. 124
Further, that federal or constitutional law supporting enforcement of
state laws did not confer any authority over tribes unless, as in United
States v. 2,005.32 Acres, there was legislation that specifically called
for it.
The Seminole Tribe of Florida saw the Bryan decision as an
opportunity and opened a casino on their reservation near Fort
Lauderdale in 1980.125 The casino's operating hours violated Florida

117San Manuel, 475 F.3d at 1306.

118 The union was the Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees International
Union (HERE).
119 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1978).
120 San Manuel, 475 F.3d at 1310.
121 Id.
122Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373 (1978).
123 Id.
1242,005.32 Acres, 160 F. Supp. at 193.
125 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310, 311 (5th Cir. 1981).

gaming laws and the tribe was sued by the state. 126 The same year, the
Cabazon Band of California opened gambling halls on their
reservation near Palm Springs, California, and was also forced to
defend the legality of their operation in court. 127 The concurrent
decisions in favor of the tribes, citing Bryan, established Indian
gaming as a legitimate endeavor beyond the reach of state law.
Legislation was passed in 1988, 12 8 but did little to curtail the
burgeoning industry.
The challenge in San Manuel rests on the applicability of federal
law to Indian tribes, not state law. The National Labor Relations Board
initially evaluated the case and found, based on past decisions, 129 that
the NLRA did not contain a tribal130exemption and was therefore the
governing law in the union dispute.
The NLRB also noted that the large numbers of non-tribe members
employed by the casino were a significant factor in the decision; as
citizens of the United States who were not Indians, they should be
allowed the same access to union representation as any other citizen
not working on a reservation or for a tribe. 13 1 To that end, they cited
Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, that "a
general statute in terms applying to all persons includes Indians and
their property interests. 1 3
The tribe did not contest that federal law applied in this case, but
rather that the tribe's actions met the exception criteria applied in
Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, to wit: "(1) the law touches
'exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural matters'; (2)
the application of the law to the tribe would 'abrogate rights
guaranteed by Indian treaties'; or (3) there is proof 'by legislative
history or some other means that Congress intended [the law] not to

126

Id. at 310.

127

California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 476 U.S. 1168 (1986).

128 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat.

2467 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21 (1988)).
129 See Fort Apache Timber Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 503, 506 (1976); Sac & Fox
Industries, Ltd., 307 N.L.R.B. 241 (1992); see also Yukon Kuskokwim Health Corp.,
328 N.L.R.B. 761, 763-64 (1999).
130 The unfair labor practices at issue were that the tribe had not permitted the
complaining union access to casino employees, though they did allow access to
another union (Communication Workers of America (CWA)).
131 San Manuel, 475 F.3d at
1308.
132

(1960).

Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 116

apply to Indians on their reservations.""" The NLRB denied the
argument, saying that the exceptions, while valid, were not met
because the activities at issue were not traditional tribal or
governmental
functions and they concerned, in large part, non134
Indians.
On appeal, the court agreed with the NLRB in finding that the
tribe's commercial activities could not be considered governmental
and that the tribe functioned more like a closely held corporation. 135 A
closely held corporation is defined for tax purposes generally as one
that has more than fifty percent of its stock owned by five or fewer
individuals. 136 This is a slight departure from traditional parameters for
tribal corporations, which include corporations formed under tribal law
and corporations formed by federal charter under section 17 of the
138
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.137 For jurisdictional purposes,
tribal corporations have heretofore been considered in a manner
similar to tribes themselves, as subject to federal law but distinct
because of their inherent relationship to a sovereign nation. 139
The tax laws governing closely held corporations are, for the most
part, irrelevant to Indian tribes, but a recent Supreme Court decision
has more significant implications. In 2014, the Supreme Court released
the Hobby Lobby decision, which redefined Constitutional protections
for corporations. 140 Hobby Lobby, along with several other
corporations professing sincere religious beliefs, contested that the

Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir.
1985) (quoting United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1980)).
134 San Manuel, 475 F.3d at 1315.
135 Id. at 1310.
136
IRS
PUBLICATION
542,
INT.
REV.
SERV.,
http://www.irs.gov/publications/p542/ar02.html#en US 2011_publink1000257739.
137 See Indian Reorganization (Wheeler-Howard) Act, ch. 576, § 17,
48 Stat.
984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 477 (1990)) ("The Secretary of the
Interior may ... issue a charter of incorporation ... Such charter may convey to the
incorporated tribe the power to purchase, take by gift, or bequest, or otherwise, own,
hold, manage, operate, and dispose of property of every description, real and
personal, including the power to purchase restricted Indian lands and to issue in
exchange therefor interests in corporate property, and such further powers as may be
incidental to the conduct of corporate business, not inconsistent with law.").
13' 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
139 For an in-depth discussion of the forms of tribal corporations and associated
legal connotations, see Graham Safty, FederalDiversity Jurisdictionand American
Indian Tribal Corporations,79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1593 (2013).
140 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751.
133

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 141 unduly
burdened their142religious expression and was, therefore, unenforceable
under RFRA.
The Supreme Court narrowly ruled for the plaintiff companies,
expanding the definition of "persons," a protected class under RFRA,
to include closely held corporations. 143 Justice Alito's opinion stated
that the extension of protections specifically to closely held
corporations was justified because:
We reject [the] argument that the owners of the
companies forfeited all RFRA protection when they
decided to organize their businesses as corporations
rather than sole proprietorships or general
partnerships. The plain terms of RFRA make it
perfectly clear that Congress did not discriminate in
this way against men and women who wish to run
their businesses as for-profit corporations in the
manner required by their religious beliefs. 144
The Court further clarified that Congress, by enacting RFRA,
"went far beyond what this Court has held is constitutionally
' 145
required."
The decision in Hobby Lobby raises two important issues relevant
to San Manuel and the precedent for applying the Constitution in
Indian law. First, if closely held corporations professing sincere
religious beliefs may be described legally as persons and are therefore
entitled to First Amendment protections of religious freedom under
RFRA, then personhood may be extended to similar bodies operating
under a cohesive, sincere, and professed religious belief-also, these
corporations are necessarily for-profit, and that religious beliefs are not
incompatible with commercial activities. Second, there was clear
legislative intent in RFRA to expand and go beyond the protections of
the First Amendment.
In San Manuel, Indian tribes were described as acting like closely
held corporations because they engaged in commercial activities (i.e.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act., Pub. L. No. 111-48, 124 Stat.
119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
142Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751.
141 Id. at 2753.
144 Id. at 2759.
145 Id. at 2760.
141

gambling), and the majority of shares was held by a small number of
individuals. 146 Also, the traditional framework of sovereign nation
status could not be properly applied to modern Indian activities
because they are
no longer exclusively acts of self-governance or tribal
147
administration.
The Court was clearly attempting to find a more compatible legal
structure with which to evaluate the San Manuel Band's labor
practices. It would be unjust to deny the protections of the National
Labor Relations Act to American citizens simply because they are
employed by a sovereign nation. The National Labor Relations Board
rightly interpreted judicial precedent in applying federal law to this
case, since federal
law has historically preserved jurisdiction over
14 8
Affairs.
Indian
However, the history of sovereign nation status and the federal
trust has maintained that the federal government exists in a paternal
capacity with regard to Indian tribes, "[f]rom their very weakness and
helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal
Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised,
there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power." 149 The
courts did not appear to predict a time in which the Indian tribes were
not only able to support themselves, but were 15necessarily
subject to the
0
entities.
commercial
other
as
regulation
same
It is arguable that the courts did not, however, view the federal
trust as either inviolable or permanent. In Nice, the opinion held that
the General Allotment Act was intended to eliminate the reservations
by converting them to either private property or public land, 15 1 thereby
ending the government's role in providing for Indian welfare and also
the unique legal limbo of sovereign nations. By extension, if Indian
tribes' sovereign nation status was to become altered or even defunct
by virtue of the fact that they operated in every way like American
citizens, it is not a significant departure to presume that the concept of
sovereign nationhood would also be altered should the tribes be held to
operate as closely held corporations.

146

San Manuel, 475 F.3d at 1315.

147 Id.
148 See

Kagama, 118 U.S. at 382-384; see also United States v. Jicarilla

Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313 (2011).
149Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384.
150 Id. at 382.
151 Nice, 241 U.S. at 599.

152
In United States v. 2,005.32 Acres of Land, echoed in Donovan,
the court also provided the means by which the federal trust could be
dissolved: any change in the application of federal law to Indian tribes
must not arise from a general statute, but instead by a legislative act
specifically intended to effect such a change. 153 The language in
RFRA stating that it applied to all federal and state laws and protected
the rights of persons is so prominent a departure from previous
legislative language, and it so clearly sidesteps the historical issue of
constitutional rights previously used to deny First Amendment
protections to tribes, that it must have been intentional. Additionally,
RFRA challenges have been employed by Indian tribes on numerous
occasions since the passage of the law in 1993; if using RFRA to
protect American Indian religious practice was not the intent of the
law, then Congress would have been obliged to remedy the error.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has already issued a ruling
favorably interpreting RFRA as protecting Indian religious practices,
and conditionally extends those protections to tribes. In McAllen
Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, the plaintiffs were charged with
violation of the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act 154 for
possessing eagle feathers without a permit at an Indian religious
ceremony. 155 The government's confiscation of the eagle feathers was
held to be wrongful because, though the possessors did not have a
permit and did not qualify for a permit, "limit[ing] the access that [the
plaintiff], as a sincere adherent to an American Indian religion, has to
possession of eagle feathers has a substantial effect on the exercise of
his religious beliefs." 156 Under RFRA and the Sherbert test, the
government was therefore required to prove that it was acting to
advance a compelling government interest and that its actions were
doing so in a way calculated to be the least restrictive to the free
expression of religion; the court concluded that the government did not
157
"discharge that burden."
Importantly, though none of the plaintiffs were members of
federally recognized tribes (and therefore did not qualify to obtain
permits lawfully under the Eagle Protection Act), the court indicated

152Donovan, 751 F.2d at 1116 (quoting United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890
(9th Cir. 1980)).
153 2,005.32 Acres, 160 F. Supp at 201. See also Confederated Tribes of Warm
Springs Reservation of Or. v. Kurtz, 691 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1982).
154 Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act of 1940, 16 U.S.C. § 668a.
155McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2014).
156 Id. at 472.
157 Id. at 473.

that it agreed with the application of RFRA to Indian tribes following
the Hobby Lobby decision. Specifically, the opinion addressed one
plaintiff who was a member of the Lipan Apache tribe. The Lipan
Apache are not federally recognized, but "the Texas Senate has
recognized the Lipan people as having lived in Texas and Northern
Mexico for 300 years and that they have had a 'government to
government' relationship with the Republic of Texas, the State of
Texas, and the United States government."' 158 The opinion argued that
special relationship between the tribe and the federal government, so
established, permitted a legal exception for the use of peyote in
American Indian religious services (as referenced in Native American
Church v. Navajo) and therefore there was no reason to deny an
exception for the use of eagle feathers. 159 However, the exception was
on purely religious grounds as permitted under RFRA and did not
extend to other protections not enacted by specifically worded

legislation. 160
The decision in San Manuel allows for the treatment of Indian
tribes like closely held corporations in a way that does not diminish the
tribes' sovereign nation status, but alters the traditional balance of
power in the federal trust relationship. This alteration is a necessary
and proper development in the continued evolution of this relationship,
and was demonstrably foreseen by the courts in that previous decisions
provided for a means to enact such changes. The RFRA legislation has
been applied by American Indian tribes in continued challenges to
federal actions impacting Indian land. The Hobby Lobby decision,
cited by McAllen Church, finds that closely held corporations, or
bodies that can be found to act like them (San Manuel), are entitled to
the same unburdened exercise of their sincere religious beliefs under
RFRA as any other person in the United States. 16 1 Therefore, the
religious beliefs of Indian tribes are inalienable rights, which add
substantial weight to the deliberative process required to proceed with
a federal action on Indian land.

IV.

RELIGION AND CULTURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

The argument for extending RFRA protections to American Indian
tribes is not without substantial precedent in the field of cultural
' Id. at 473-474.

159Id. at 473. See also Navajo, 272 F.2d at 135.
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resource preservation. Of the laws previously enacted to protect
American Indian cultural heritage, all recognize three basic principles:
(1) that a tribe's religious history is indivisible from its cultural or
ethnic history; (2) that an archaeological or historical site does not
necessarily consist of an artifact deposit, but rather includes sacred
places of worship or religious use; and (3) that162Indian religious
expression is a living and vital part of tribal identity.
The National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 is consistently
used as a tool to identify, document, and protect American Indian
heritage. The NHPA provides not only for a means of preserving
information about the location and significance of historic sites, but
also, under section 106, requires that all federal agencies undertake an
evaluation of potential harms before projects can be approved. 163 This
system of identification and review has not entirely prevented
destruction or damage to historic and cultural resources, but has served
to at least make the harm a matter of public record and to call attention
to the need for preservation.
Sites of interest are carefully evaluated under specific criteria to
determine their relative value to the canon of American cultural
heritage, and graded according to merit. 164 Importantly, many Indian
sites, such as the Wounded Knee National Historic Landmark in South
Dakota, are described as religious sites in both the past and the
present. 165 Wounded Knee was the site of a major historical event, but
has limited potential to produce artifacts or yield new information
about Indian history; its primary significance is as a worship area166
and
memorial for several tribes affiliated with the larger Sioux Nation.
In comparison, the Medicine Wheel National Historic Landmark in
Wyoming is of historical value, with the potential to produce artifacts
and yield important new historical information, but is listed primarily
because of its great religious and cultural significance to the Crow and
Arapaho tribes. Both signifiers are essential because the site was, and
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continues to be, used for religious ceremonies
inextricably bound to
167
culture.
Arapaho
and
Crow
traditional
The Department of the Interior, in administering the NHPA,
consistently finds that religion is paramount in determining the
significance of American Indian sites. 168 Also, peculiar to American
Indian resources, the terms "cultural," "religious," and "ethnic," are
used nearly interchangeably; there are few examples of truly secular
sites or resources. The Department of the Interior employs similar
approaches in applying NAGPRA, generally failing to distinguish
between Indian remains, burial sites, and artifacts for the purposes of
protection; all are protected as objects or expressions of "cultural
patrimony." 169 NAGPRA also defines "sacred objects" as those
"ceremonial objects which are needed by traditional Native American
religious leaders for the practice of traditional Native American
religions by their present day adherents,"
specifically noting the
170
religion.
Indian
of
enduring character
The purpose of NHPA and NAGPRA with regard to American
Indian cultural resources, as well as other relevant legislation such as
NEPA or the Wilderness Act, is to inform the federal government in
its administration of the federal trust. The government is charged with
protecting the best interests of the tribes, and it is indubitable that17the
1
preservation of cultural heritage falls within the scope of that duty.
RFRA is similar to the above-described conservation acts in that it
exists to prevent abuse of discretion by the federal government. RFRA
relates to matters of religious freedom, and by extension honors the
cultural traditions that produce "sincere religious belief." 172 The
language deliberately goes above and beyond the establishment clause
to protect the rights of all persons in the United States. 17 RFRA does
167 Fred Chapman, The Bighorn Medicine Wheel, 1988-1999, 22 CULTURAL
REs. MGMT. 5 (1999).
168 See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986). See also McAllen, 764 F.3d
at 465.
169 25 U.S.C. § 3001.

170 25 U.S.C. § 3001(2), (3)(C).
171See Cherokee, 30 U.S. at 17.
172Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 398 (refuted by Employment Division v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990), but was passed into law under the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993). "Sincere religious belief' is the backbone of religious freedom claims.
Division, 494 U.S. at 893.
173 See U.S. CONST. art. I, §2, cl. 3 ("Representatives and direct Taxes shall be
apportioned among the several States . . .excluding Indians not taxed."). See also
U.S. CONST. art I, §8 ("Congress shall have the power to regulate Commerce with
foreign nations and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.").

not define what type of expression is protected, or require it to
conform to any known standard; in contrast, it protects past and
present exercise of religion regardless of ethnicity, culture, or creed.
If RFRA's purpose is interpreted to be functionally the same as
other legislation enacted to serve as a check on the government's
administrative power with regard to Indian land and resources, it is
reasonable to apply it as such in the courts. Further, there exists a
precedent in the field of cultural resource preservation for holding
culture and religion inextricable in describing objects or sites
associated with Indian tribes. 174 Issues of Indian history and culture are
one and the same as issues of Indian religion, making RFRA a
necessary tool to ensure the continued cohesive existence of individual
tribes.
CONCLUSION

Historically, the relationship between the federal government and
Indian tribes has heavily favored the interests of the government in
both practical powers and execution of the federal trust. The courts
have long regarded the legislative authority of Congress to be the
ultimate authority over Indian tribes, with the ability to vacate treaties
or exercise its possessory right to land as circumstances required. Until
the late twentieth century, legislative action rarely favored Indian
tribes, instead perpetuating a paternalistic policy of guardianship and
preserving tribal sovereignty as a means of excluding Indians from the
basic protections afforded all other American citizens.
However, changes in federal policy and recent judicial decisions
have created opportunities for Indian tribes to receive the full
protection of the law without sacrificing their traditional autonomy.
Specifically, under the ruling in San Manuel, Indian tribes may
properly be treated like closely held corporations, which qualify as
persons for the purpose of claiming the right to free expression of their
traditional religions. This has important implications for the future of
the federal trust relationship because tribes may be able to successfully
challenge federal actions on Indian land if there is the potential for
harm to sacred religious sites. It also shifts the balance of power in
174
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favor of the tribes and creates a reasonable legal framework for
regulating thriving Indian commercial activities. The fiduciary duty of
the federal government known as the federal trust is intended to
protect the best interests of Indian sovereign nations, and to do so, the
relationship must continue to evolve.

